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WHELAN ASSOCIATES v. JASLO W
DENTAL LABORATORY'
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer technology is among the most rapidly changing aspects of
society, something which few would say of the law. Indeed, the meeting
of the two might be said to resemble a confrontation between the proverbial
tortoise and hare. Nevertheless, the courts have begun to confront the
issues which this most modern form of intellectual property raises.
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory is arguably the most
significant of the growing number of recent decisions which have addressed
the scope of copyright protection available to computer software. 2 Resolving
the case of first impression in the federal appellate courts, the Third Circuit
held that copyright law protects the structure and organization of a computer
program, not just the literal computer code in which the program is written.
The court also declared a rule for distinguishing protected and unprotected
aspects of computer programs,3 and announced a modified substantial
similarity test for use in computer software cases.
The Whelan ruling was reported as "a 'bombshell' for the computer
industry, ' 4 and a "landmark decision" which represents "the farthest
extension" of copyright protection of software by the courts to date. 5 It
1. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub. nom. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc. v. Whelan Assocs., 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
2. Id. The intense interest this issue arouses in the computer industry and
the general business community is easily explained: software sales in the United
States now total in the tens of billions of dollars annually. STANDARD & POORS,
Computers & Office Equipment, in STANDARD & PooRs IND. StumvEys (1987).
3. The rule distinguishes idea from expression in the computer software
context. The idea-expression dichotomy, one of the fundamental concepts underlying
copyright law, reflects the fact that copyright does not protect ideas, but does
protect their expression. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982); Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see infra notes 53, 89-102 and accompanying text.
4. Staines, Idke or ide fixe?, 50 MOD. L. REv. 368, 369-70 (1987).
5. Maier, Software Protection-Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade
Secret Law, 1987 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 151, 160. 1
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has already generated controversy among scholars, 6 influenced subsequent
federal trial court decisions,7 and raised the possibility of a split in authority
among the federal circuit courts.8
II. FACTS
Jaslow Dental Laboratory (hereinafter JDL), the defendant in Whelan,
is a manufacturer of "dental prosthetics and devices." 9 Rand Jaslow, an
shareholder and officer of JDL who had some limited computer experience,
attempted to write a computer program which would increase the efficiency
of JDL's business operations. 0 After finding that he lacked the ability to
create a satisfactory program, Jaslow hired Strohl Systems Group, a custom-
software developer, to write the program." The contract provided that
Strohl would retain ownership of the software, including the right to sell
it to other dental laboratories, and that JDL would receive a 10%0 royalty
on any such sales.' 2 Elaine Whelan, a half-owner and officer of Strohl,
was to do the work. 13
Ms. Whelan began by visiting JDL and other dental laboratories for
interviews aimed at developing an understanding of the "layout, workflow,
and administration of dental laboratories generally.' ' 4 On the basis of this
knowledge, she wrote a computer program designed to assist the admin-
6. See generally Gesmer, Developments in the Law of Computer Software
Copyright Infringement, 26 Juprnnnucs J. 224 (1986); Maier, supra note 5; Staines,
supra note 4; Sutton, Equities, Evidence, and the Elusive Scope of Copyright
Protection for Computer Software, 1987 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 551.
7. Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). For discussion of these cases, see infra notes 187-
216 and accompanying text.
8. Compare Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986) with Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80
(1987) (declining to adopt the Whelan position where the structure of the allegedly
infringing program was dictated by the subject matter). Plains Cotton Coop is
discussed infra at notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
9. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1225.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. All parties understood that "the operation of dental laboratories was
substantially the same throughout the industry and that it would be quite feasible
to adapt the system that would be developed for Jaslow Laboratory to many other
dental laboratories." Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp.
1307, 1310 (E.D. Pa.), amended in part, 609 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd,
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc. v. Whelan Assocs. 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
13. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1225.
14. Id. at 1225-26.
[Vol. 54
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istration of the dental laboratory business. 15 She wrote the program, called
Dentalab, in EDL (Event Driven Language), the computer language which
the JDL computer used. 16 When it was complete, JDL began using Dentalab
in its business. 17 Ms. Whelan subsequently left Strohl and formed Whelan
Associates, Inc., which acquired Strohl's rights in Dentalab. 18 Whelan
Associates entered into a contract with JDL providing for cooperative
efforts in marketing Dentalab to other dental laboratories.1 9 The agreement
provided that JDL would market the program in return for a minority
percentage of gross sales, while Whelan Associates would refine and improve
the program and would also continue to sell it.20 The contract was terminable
after a year by thirty days notice from either party.
2
'
While marketing the program pursuant to the contract, Rand Jaslow
discovered that demand for Dentalab was restricted by the fact that many
smaller dental laboratories used personal computers incompatible with EDL,
the computer language in which Dentalab was written.22 He began working
on a dental laboratory business program he called Dentcom PC, using
BASIC, a computer language compatible with most personal computers.2
To facilitate his work, Jaslow "surreptitiously ... obtained" a copy of
the source code of Dentalab, which the terms of the contracts with Strohl
Systems and Whelan Associates forbade him to have.? In writing Dentcom,
he "attempted to adopt in almost exact duplication all of the functions,
the format of the screens, the language and abbreviations, methods of
collating, the file structure and work flow" of the Dentalab program.
25
Whelan Associates also developed a BASIC language version of Dentalab
for personal computers. 26
After he essentially completed Dentcom, 7 Rand Jaslow gave Whelan
Associates thirty days notice of termination of their contract. 28 Claiming









24. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1314
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1316.
27. Jaslow hired a professional programmer to finish the program after
working on it for about a year. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1227. The programmer used
Jaslow's work, "which [he] found to be the work of a talented but unskilled
amateur, containing many errors, and showing a lack of expertise in computer
programming and designing." Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609
F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
28. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1226.
1989]
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that JDL owned exclusive marketing rights to Dentalab, and that Dentalab
contained trade secrets belonging to JDL, Jaslow demanded that Whelan
Associates respect JDL's marketing rights and not use or disclose its trade
secrets.29 Despite this "thinly veiled threat,"30 Whelan Associates continued
to sell Dentalab.3 '
On the day the contract expired, JDL sued Whelan Associates in a
Pennsylvania state court for misappropriation of trade secrets. 2 Rand Jaslow
then formed Dentcom, Inc., which began selling both the Dentcom and
Dentalab programs to dental laboratories.33 Whelan Associates responded
by filing a copyright infringement suit against JDL, Rand Jaslow, and
Dentcom, Inc. in federal court.14 JDL's trade secret action was removed
to federal court and became a counterclaim." Defendants abandoned the
claim after the court refused to grant a preliminary injunction forbidding
Whelan Associates' alleged use of JDL's trade secrets.16
In their answer to Whelan Associates' complaint, the defendants denied
that they had copied Dentalab,37 and asserted that Rand Jaslow had de-
veloped Dentcom independently.38 They also claimed that Whelan Associates'
copyright in Dentalab was invalid.3 9
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1227.
32. Id. at 1226-27.
33. Id. at 1227.
34. Id. Jaslow's partners in the two corporations were also named as de-
fendants. Id.
35. Id. at 1227-28. Whelan Associates' complaint also alleged that use by
Dentcom, Inc. of the terms "Dentalab" and "Dentlab" in connection with its
sales violated both state and federal trademark law regarding false designation of
origin. Id. at 1227. Defendants argued that their use of these terms was not a
violation because the terms were merely descriptive. Id. In addition, Whelan As-
sociates alleged tortious interference with contractual relations, and each side accused
the other of unfair competition. Id.
36. Id. at 1228.
37. Id. at 1227.
38. Id. As the Third Circuit noted in its opinion, "independent creation is
a complete defense to a claim of copyright infringement." Id. at 1227 n.7.
39. Id. Defendants argued alternatively that (1) Rand Jaslow was a co-author
of Dentalab, so that omission of his name from the registration form was fatal
to the copyright, or (2) Rand Jaslow owned Dentalab as a work-made-for-hire,
since Elaine Whelan had been employed by him when she wrote the program. Id.
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that:
(a) Initial ownership.-Copyright in a work protected under this title vests
initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint
work are coowners of copyright in the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire.-In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered
the author for purposes of this title, and unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
4
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At trial, each side called an expert witness to testify concerning the
similarities and differences between Dentalab and Dentcom. Plaintiff's ex-
pert testified that, while Dentcom was not a "translation" of Dentalab,
the two programs were significantly similar in structure.4 He based this
conclusion on a finding that "most of the file structures, and the screen
outputs, of the programs were virtually identical," and that five "partic-
ularly important 'subroutines' within both programs ... performed almost
identically . ". . .,4 Defendants' expert, however, found that there were
many differences between the source and object codes of the two programs, 42
and this indicated that Dentcom was "not directly derived" from Dentalab.
43
He conceded that the two programs had "overall structural similarities." 44
The district court concluded that defendants had infringed Whelan
Associates' copyright, ruling that the copyright was valid, and that Rand
Jaslow had not created Dentcom independently.45 The court based its finding
of infringement on its conclusion that Dentcom was substantially similar
to Dentalab because its structure and "overall organization were substan-
tially similar."46 The court awarded damages based on sales of Dentcom,
and enjoined defendants from any further sales of either program. 47
The defendants appealed on the issue of whether the district court
ruling that Dentcom infringed48 the Dentalab copyright was erroneous.
4 9
rights comprised in the copyright.
(d) Transfer of Ownership.-(1) The ownership of a copyright may be
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation
of law ....
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
40. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1228.
41. Id.
42. "Source code" and "object code" are defined infra note 72.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320
(E.D. Pa. 1985). The district court ruled that Elaine Whelan was the sole author
of Dentalab, and that Strohl had retained (and later assigned to plaintiff) all rights
in the Dentalab copyright under the terms of the contract under which the program
was written. Id. at 1318-19.
46. Id. at 1322 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 1322-23.
48. In order to prove copyright infringement a plaintiff must show (1) that
she owns the copyright on the work in question, and (2) that defendant copied
her copyrighted work. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231; see, e.g., Ferguson v.
National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978). While copying can be
shown by either direct or circumstantial evidence, the latter is usually employed,
since direct evidence to prove copying is seldom available. Roth Greeting Cards
v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). To prove copying by
circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must show (a) access to the copyrighted work
on the part of the defendant, and (b) substantial similarity between the copyrighted
1989]
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The trial court had based its ruling on the structural similarity of the two
programs.5 0 As the appellate opinion put it, the appeal therefore presented
a "case of first impression in the courts of appeals" which required a
decision on "whether the structure (or sequence and organization) of a
computer program is protectable by copyright, or whether the protection
of the copyright law extends only as far as the literal computer code."'"
III. HOLDING
In Whelan, the Third Circuit reached three conclusions of great sig-
nificance for copyright infringement cases involving computer software.
The central holding was that "copyright protection of computer programs
may extend beyond the programs' literal code to their structure, sequence,
and organization."52 This pronouncement, combined with the court's holding
that the district court's finding of substantial similarity in structure between
the programs at issue was not clearly erroneous, prompted the circuit court
to affirm the lower court's ruling that defendants' Dentcom program
infringed plaintiff's copyright in Dentalab.
The court also announced two new legal doctrines for application in
copyright infringement cases involving computer software. The first of these
was a rule for distinguishing the aspects of a computer program which
copyright protects from those which it does not. It is a fundamental postulate
of intellectual property law that "copyright does not protect ideas, but
only expressions of ideas.' '1 3 The new rule provided a basis for differentiating
the unprotected ideas in a computer program from the protected expression
of those ideas: it distinguished the "end sought to be achieved" or the
"purpose or function" of a program from all program aspects "not
necessary to that purpose or function. '5
4
work and the allegedly infringed work. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232; Ferguson, 584
F.2d at 113. Some scholars suggest an inverse relationship between the.required
levels of proof of substantial similarity and access. See, e.g., A. MILLER & M.
DAVIs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT § 22.2, at
331 (1983).
49. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1229.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1224.
52. Id. at 1248. The Third Circuit gave this issue plenary or de novo review
on appeal since it involved solely a question of law. Id. at 1233 n.25.
53. Id. at 1234. This doctrine, established in the leading case of Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), is now part of the Copyright Act, which provides that
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
54. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1236.
[Vol. 54
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The second new legal doctrine was a one-part test which allowed a
finding of substantial similarity between computer programs on the basis
of expert testimony alone. This new Whelan test replaced the traditional,
two-part Arnstein55 test for substantial similarity, which required separate
consideration of expert and lay opinion. The district court based its ruling
entirely on expert testimony, and the circuit court concluded that such
evidence was sufficient for a finding of infringement.
This Comment will discuss these three Whelan court conclusions in
detail, and survey their application in copyright infringement cases involving
computer software since the Whelan decision.
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND
United* States copyright law is founded on the patent and copyright
clause of the Constitution.56 It provides that "The Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. ' 5 7 Congress most recently exercised its
copyright power in the Copyright Act of 1976, which declares that "copy-
right protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 58 Since the Act covers
media of expression not yet invented as well as those currently existing,
and includes situations where machines aid human perception of the ex-
pression, its basic principles extend to computer software.59 The statutory
55. The traditional test is set out in the leading case of Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57. Id.
58. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
59. Copyright law protects the original expression created by the author of
a copyrighted work by granting the author certain exclusive rights, including the
right to copy the work, to produce derivative works based on it, and to sell, lease,
or transfer copies to the public. Id. § 106. In the case of works created after the
effective date of the 1976 Act (January 1, 1978), such as the programs at issue
in Whelan, this limited monopoly lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years.
Id. §§ 301-05.
Section 106 of the Act, which sets out the author's exclusive rights, reads as follows:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
1989]
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category to which computer programs belong is that of "literary works."' 6
Congress explicitly included software within the ambit of the Act
through passage of the 1980 Computer Software Copyright Act, 6' which
amended the Copyright Act of 1976. The 1980 amendments added computer-
related language to § 101, and reworded § 117 to allow an owner of a
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
Id. § 106.
The Act defines "copies" as "material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device .... " Id. § 101. It defines
"derivative work" as:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship,
is a "derivative work".
Id.
Derivative works are also covered by § 103, which provides the following:
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes
compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing
preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any
part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such a work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, own-
ership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting ma-
terial.
Id. § 103.
60. According to the Act, " 'Literary works' are works, other than au-
diovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols
or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are em-
bodied." Id. § 101. Since computer programs consist of "words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols," they fall within this definition. Computer disks were
included among the expression media covered by this definition in the 1980 "com-
puter amendments" to the Act. 1980 Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 117 (1982)).
61. Id. 8
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copy of a program to make a single additional copy or adaptation of the
program for archival or computer-use purposes. 62 The amendments followed
without variation the recommendations of the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), which Congress
had established to study the relation of new technology and copyright
law. 6
3
Even after passage of the 1980 amendments, the Copyright Act provided
at most a rudimentary outline of how copyright protection might affect
computer software. During the 1980s, the federal courts began the task of
more clearly defining such protection, through the accretionary process of
common law decisionmaking. 64
62. Section 117 provides:
[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program
to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession
of the computer program should cease to be rightful ....
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). Section 117 also allows sale, lease,
or other transfer of the additional copy it authorizes, but only as part of transfer
of all rights in the program. Id. Authorization from the copyright owner is required
to transfer an adaptation. Id.
In addition to permitting a single user-made copy under certain conditions, § 117
also resolves a copyright problem unique to software. When a computer "runs"
or uses a program, it does not remove the program from the medium where it
was stored (usually on disk) to the computer's memory, but rather makes a copy
of the program in its memory. Although this copy is erased when the computer
is turned off, during use of the program it exists long enough to violate the statutory
prohibition against copying in at least a technical sense. Section 117 covers this
anomaly by allowing the making of a copy "as an essential step in the utilization
of the computer program in conjunction with a machine," id., and thus prevents
each use of a program from infringing the author's copyright, as it otherwise
would.
63. Fn.AL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMIssIoN ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
UsEs OF COPYRIGH TrED WORKS (1978). The Commission had recommended legislation:
(1) to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they
embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter of cop-
yright; (2) to [make the Act] apply to all computer uses of copyrighted
programs . . . , and (3) to assure that rightful possessors of copies of
computer programs may use or adapt these copies for their use.
Id. at 1.
64. The uncertain parameters of statutory protection led to sharp scholarly
debate over whether software can be adequately protected by traditional intellectual
property law, or should be the subject of some sui generis statutory scheme,
analogous to that which Congress enacted for computer semiconductor chips.
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. IV 1986);
see, e.g., Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L.
1989]
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The courts first considered whether the Copyright Act protects all forms
of computer programs. 65 In a series of decisions now referred to as the
REv. 1329 (1987); Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting
Computer Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 1131 (1986); Samuelson, Creating a New
Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer
Programs, 70 MnN. L. Rnv. 471 (1985). However, the passage of time, the growing
body of judicial decisions involving software, and the absence of any congressional
move toward such a scheme combine to suggest that, for better or worse, legal
protection for software will be governed in large part by traditional copyright
concepts as elucidated and elaborated by the federal courts.
This may be a desirable result. As one commentator has pointed out, the
common law approach allows the incremental application of collective wisdom,
developed by seeking justice in the precise factual circumstances of particular cases,
and permits correction of mistakes by distinguishing cases on their facts. Davidson,
Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1037, 1063-70 (1986).
As a result, it allows the law to respond to changing circumstances and technological
advances. Therefore, development of a coherent and adequate legal policy regarding
software may be better accomplished through the common law than the legislative
process, which is subject to special-interest, pork-barrel politics, and produces a
result frozen in time. Davidson points out that "no one person, or group of
persons, is bright enough, farsighted enough and wise enough to integrate the
complexity of a new technology like software into our economy. The collective
wisdom represented by a myriad of decisions in the common law process, however,
contains the intelligence to do just that, justly and wisely." Id. at 1070.
Computer software is also protected, in varying degrees, by patent and trade
secret law. See generally Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: The Copyrighti
Trade Secret Interface, 47 U. PITT. L. Rv. 907 (1986); Maier, Software Protection:
Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 151
(1987); Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. PITT. L.
REv. 1229 (1986); Stout, Protection of Programming in the Aftermath of Diamond
v. Diehr, 4 ComPUTER L.J. 207 (1983); Syrowik, Intellectual Property Rights in
Software-A Look at the Basics, 1986 MICH. B.J. 292; Note, Protection of Pro-
prietary Rights in Computer Programs: A "Basic" Formula for Debugging the
System, 57 ST. JoAN's L. REv. 92 (1982).
For discussion of the issues involved in copyright protection of computer
software, see generally D. BENDER, COmpUTER LAW: SorTAIE PROTECTION (1985);
T. HARuus, Tim LEGAL GUIDE TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION (1985); D.
LONGLEY & M. SHArN, DICTIONARY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2d ed. 1986);
A. N SMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (1985); J. SoiA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW (1983); Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L.
REv. 959 (1986); Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer
Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REv. 563 (1985); Davidson, Common Law,
Uncommon Software, 47 U. PIrr. L. REv. 1037 (1986); Desjeux, From Design to
Software: Software, Video Games and Copyright; The Analytical Method in the
Test of Technology, 2 J.L. INFo. Sci. 18 (1986); Gesmer, Developments in the
Law of Computer Software Copyright Infringement, 26 JuRiIMmTIcs J. 224 (1986);
Goldberg, Computers and Copyright: The Next Generation, 196 N.Y.L.J., Sept.
19, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Pro-
tection, the Evolving Concept of Derivative Works, and the Proper Limits of
Licensing Arrangements, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 105 (1986); Howe, Circling the
[Vol. 54
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"first generation" of software copyright cases,6 the federal appellate courts
Wagons: The Industry Is Turning to Litigation in an Attempt to Stem the Hem-
orrhage of Pirated Intellectual Properties, 32 DATAmATON 42(3) (1986); Maier,
Software Protection: Integrating Patent, Copyright, and Trade Secret Law, 69 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 151 (1987); Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer
Software, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1329 (1987); Pierce, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, 30 CoPYRIGHT L. SYMiP. 1 (1983); Radcliffe, Recent Developments in
Copyright Law Related to Computer Software, 4 COMPUTER L. REP. 189 (1985);
Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting Computer Software,
47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1131 (1986); Raysman & Brown, Copyright Protection Expanded
for Software, 196 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Raysman & Brown,
Copyright Protection Extended to a "Total Concept" of Software, 9 Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 26, 1987, at 16, col. 2; Raysman & Brown, New Regulations Issued for
Software, 197 N.Y.L.J., June 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Reback & Hayes, Copyright
Gone Astray: The Misappropriation Alternative, 3 COMPUTER L. 1 (1986); Russo
& Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software, 2 COMPUTER
L. 1 (1985); Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying
the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REv. 471 (1985);
Schachter, Software Protection in the Throes of a Legal Morass, 33 DATAMATION
49(5) (June 1, 1987); Staines, Idle or idle fixe?, 50 MOD. L. REv. 368 (1987);
Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1229
(1986); Sutton, Equities, Evidence, and the Elusive Scope of Copyright Protection
for Computer Software, 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 551 (1987); Wharton, Use and
Expression: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 6 COMPUTER
L.J. 433 (1985); Comment, Copyright Protection of Software in the EEC: The
Competing Policies Underlying Community and National Law and the Case for
Harmonization, 75 CAL. L. REv. 633 (1987); Comment, Combatting Software Piracy:
A Statutory Proposal to Strengthen Software Copyright, 34 DE PAUL L. REv. 1005
(1985); Comment, Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software: An
Analytical Framework, 18 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 919 (1985); Comment, Improving
the International Framework for the Protection of Computer Software, 48 U. PrrT.
L. R v. 1151 (1987); Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Flow Logic and
Algorithms, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 257 (1984); Note, Copyright in the Look and "Feel"
of Computer Software, 309 CoPYRIGHT & NEw TECH. 181 (1985); Note, Copyright
Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity
Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264 (1984); Note, The Creative Commissioner: Com-
missioned Works Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 373 (1987);
Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions
in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 385 (1981); Note, Defining
the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REv. 497
(1986); Note, The Creative Commissioner: Commissioned Works Under the Cop-
yright Act of 1976, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 373 (1987); Annotation, Copyright Protection
of Computer Programs Under Federal Copyright Laws, 70 A.L.R. FED. 176 (1984
& Supp. 1987).
65. The Copyright Act defines "computer program" as follows: "A 'com-
puter program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). This def'iition was part of the 1980 amendments to the
Act concerning computer technology. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
66. Ginsberg, Computers and Copyright: The Next Generation, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 19, 1986, p.1, col. 1, at 28, col. 1.
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concluded that copyright law protects not only programs written in source
code, but also programs written in object code or fixed in semiconductor
chips. 67 They also determined that copyright protection extends to both
operating system programs and application programs. 6 The basic principle
which evolved in these cases is that all computer programs which meet the
threshold requirements of the Act can be protected by copyright, regardless
of their form, their function, or their fixation in a given medium.
69
In a small but growing number of "second generation ' 70 cases, the
courts have begun to face two more difficult issues: the scope of copyright
protection for software, and the proper test for infringement in software
cases. 71 Whelan was the first "second-generation" case requiring resolution
of these issues at the appellate level.
67. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l,
Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). In concluding that copyright protection extends
to all forms of computer programs, the courts rejected arguments by some scholars
that programs in object code could not be copyrighted because they were useful
articles. See, e.g., Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DuKH L.J.
663.
68. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1253.
69. The Act limits copyright protection to "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device." Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
102 (1982) (emphasis added). According to the Act, "[a] work is 'fixed' in a
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord,
by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration ... ." Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
70. Ginsberg, Computers and Copyright: The Next Generation, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 19, 1986, p.1, col. 1, at 28, col. 1.
71. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986);
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.
1985); Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Williams
v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp.
of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
As one observer put it:
During 1985 software copyright law entered what promises to be a much
longer and more difficult phase of its development .... [T]he courts
have taken the first steps in determining the scope of protection afforded
by the copyright in a computer program. These cases hold that copyright
protection extends far beyond the literal text of a program's source code
to include its structure and organization and the manner in which it
operates, controls and regulates a computer.
Gesmer, Developments in the Law of Computer Software Copyright Infringement,
26 JuRBTTmics J. 224 (1986).
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V. THE SCOPE-OF-PROTECTION DILEMMA
To decide whether copyright protection extends to computer program
structure, the Third Circuit had to resolve a dilemma which the program
authorial process raised. As the court observed, "the coding process is a
comparatively small part of programming. By far the larger portion of the
expense and difficulty in creating computer programs is attributable to the
development of the structure and logic of the program . . rather than
to the coding." 72 This meant that copyright protection which covered only
the written program code would be worth comparatively little. As one
commentator has remarked,
With little understanding of the functional ideas of a program, an infringer
can change enough aspects of a program to make it look very different
to a lay observer. Even when the program is translated from one computer
to another, or one language to another, an infringer can create the new
software without first understanding the functional ideas in it (by an
'iterative' process essentially of transcribing it statement by statement). A
program which took months or years to develop is then appropriated in
days or weeks, leaving the originator little protection or incentive. 3
Given the amount of time and money which a program's creator must
invest in the other steps of writing a program, extending copyright protection
72. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231. The court found that the process
of writing a program consists of four basic steps. Id. at 1229. First, the programmer
identifies the problem the program is intended to solve, and acquires the information
necessary to understand the problem. Id. Second, she outlines a solution. Id. at
1230. This outline normally takes the form of a flow chart, which may be comprised
of several modules or subroutines designed to perform various operations which
are part of the solution of the problem. Id. Third, the programmer makes decisions
concerning data to be used by the program. Id. She determines what data are
needed by the program, the point during program operation at which the data
should be inserted, and how the data should be arranged and combined with other
data. This step involves setting up an arrangement of data files within the program
for reception and control of the data. Id. at 1230, 1242-44. The structure of the
program is created by steps two and three. Id. at 1230. Fourth, the program
structure or design is coded, or translated into a language understood by the
computer. Id. This step normally has two stages. The programmer translates the
program structure into source code, the symbols of a computer language under-
standable by human programmers and usable with the particular type of computer
on which the program is to be used. Id. The source code is then translated by
another computer program into object code, a binary code made up entirely of
"I"s and "0"s which will instruct the computer to perform the functions of the
program. Id. at 1230-31.
It is now well established that both the source code and object code versions
of a program are protected by copyright. The settling of this issue was a major
focus of the "first generation" of software copyright cases, discussed supra notes
65-69 and accompanying text.
73. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv.
1037, 1085 (1986).
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to program code alone might well discourage the development of new
programs. Such a result would run contrary to a basic purpose of copyright
law, the fostering of authorial creativity. 74
However, the court also had to consider that extension of copyright
protection to the structure and logic of programs could embroil the courts
in major difficulties. Creation of program structure by a programmer
involves not only authorial expression, but use and often generation of
ideas. While expression is protectable, ideas themselves are not. Copyright
protection for program structure, then, would require a way to distinguish
expression from idea in the context of computer software, a context in
which many fact finders lack experience. In addition, overzealous protection
of program structure could discourage programmers from using the ideas
developed in previous programs, for fear of infringement liability. This
would also run contrary to a basic purpose of copyright law, enriching
society through the spread of knowledge. 7
The Whelan court resolved this dilemma by linking extension of copy-
right protection to the structure of computer programs with both a rule
for distinguishing idea from expression in the software context and a
substantial similarity test allowing infringement findings based on expert
testimony.
VI. GROUNDS FOR EXTENDING PROTECTION TO PROGRAM STRUCTURE
The court found that copyright protection for software structure was
appropriate prima facie because computer programs are classified as literary
works under the Copyright Act.76 It is well established that the copyrights
of literary works such as books and plays can be infringed by works which
copy their plot structures.77 Such copying can constitute infringement even
where there is no substantial similarity between the literal elements or
written expression of the copyrighted and infringing works. 7 By analogy,
74. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1235.
75. Id. at 1235.
76. Id. at 1234. This classification is supported by the statutory definition
of "literary work," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (see supra note 60) and by the legislative
history of the Copyright Act. See H.R. RP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWs 5659, 5667.
77. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1234.
78. Id. See also, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc.,
715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983) (13 plot similarities between two movies sufficient
for finding of copyright infringement); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (L. Hand, J.) (established
sliding scale for protection of structure, with protection attaching at a point of
sufficient complexity and development; protection "cannot be limited literally to
the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations").
[Vol. 54
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software copyrights could also be infringed by copying program structure3 9
The court also believed that in granting copyright protection to com-
pilations and derivative works,8 0 the Copyright Act of 1976 extended pro-
tection to the structure of literary works by implication." Under the Act,
a compilation is "a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting material or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original
work of authorship. ' 8 2 A derivative work is one "based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a[n] ... abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."83 As the
court put it,
it is clear from the definitions of compilations and derivative works, and
the protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact that
the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted, i.e., that
the sequence and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea, of
a work."
The court found further statutory support for extending copyright
protection to computer program structure in the legislative history of the
1980 Computer Software Copyright Act."5 Since Congress adopted the
recommendations of the CONTU Report 6 without demur in enacting the
1980 amendments, the Report arguably constituted legislative history for
those parts of the Copyright Act which were amended. 7 The Report stated
that "flow charts, source codes, and object codes are works of authorship
in which copyright subsists . *..."88
79. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1234. Using this analogy, a program flow
chart is seen as similar to a plot outline.
The court noted that the type of substantial similarity involved is comprehensive
nonliteral similarity, a term coined by A. NmBMR, 3 NIBER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[A] (1985), to indicate "a similarity not just as to a particular line or paragraph
or other minor segment, but where the fundamental essence or structure of one
work is duplicated in another." Id. § 13-20.1 The other possible type of substantial
similarity noted by Nimmer is fragmented literal similarity. Id.
80. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
81. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1239.
82. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
83. Id.
84. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1239.
85. Id. at 1241. See Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)).
86. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
87. See Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 n.7 (D.
Mass. 1984). The Whelan court rejected defendants' argument that the Report
constituted legislative history for any part of the Act not amended, and their
contention that it recommended limiting copyright protection to the literal code of
computer programs. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1241-42.
88. Id. at 1241 (quoting the CONTU Report at 21) (emphasis added).
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However, the idea/expression dichotomy governs copyright protection
of literary works.8 9 Consequently, copyright cannot protect the structure
of a computer program if it constitutes the idea of the program rather
than the expression of that idea.9 The Whelan defendants had argued that,
by definition, program structure always constituted idea rather than ex-
pression. 9' The Third Circuit rejected this per se approach, and constructed
a rule to distinguish idea from expression under the facts of particular
software cases. 92
VII. RULE FoR DisTnouns~mo IDEA FROM EXPRESSION IN SOFTWARE
CASES
The Whelan court derived its new idea/expression rule for computer
software cases from Baker v. Selden,91 a leading copyright case involving
a book which explained a new method of accounting.94 The book contained
blank forms, consisting of ruled lines and headings, to be employed in
using the new accounting method. 95 Plaintiff argued that these forms were
part of the copyrightable text of the book, and that defendant had infringed
plaintiff's copyright by publishing accounting books including copies of
the forms.96 Defendant argued that the forms were part of the new ac-
counting method which was the idea of plaintiff's book, and hence were
not protected. 97 The Supreme Court decided the issue by means of a
"necessary incident of the idea" rule, which it expressed as follows: "[W]here
the art [the accounting method] it teaches cannot be used without employing
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as
necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public." 98 The
court held that the forms were necessary incidents of using plaintiff's
89. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
90. Id. The "first generation" computer software cases had already affirmed
that the idea/expression dichotomy applies in the computer context. See Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983);
see also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
91. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1235.
92. Id. at 1235-37.
93. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
94. The Whelan court noted that both Baker and Whelan involved literary
works which also had a utilitarian function. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1235.
The book at issue in Baker could be used to execute the new accounting method,
since it contained forms for that purpose, and the computer programs at issue in
Whelan could be used in conjunction with a computer to perform management
functions appropriate to a dental laboratory.
95. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100.
96. Id. at 100-01.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 103.
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method of accounting, and as such were not protected by copyright.9
The Baker "necessary incident" rule was founded on the fact that the
book's idea, the accounting method, could not be expressed without using
substantially similar forms. In other words, the expressive and conceptual
aspects of the forms had merged. A copyright monopoly in the forms
would have conferred a monopoly in the idea itself. If enough other ways
of expressing the method had existed, the forms would not have been
necessary incidents of the idea. l °°
The Third Circuit saw in the Baker rule a way to distinguish idea
from expression in- the computer software context. In the court's words,
Just as Baker v. Selden focused on the end sought to be achieved by
Selden's book, the line between idea and expression may be drawn with
reference to the end sought to be achieved by the work in question. In
other words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function
would be part of the expression of the idea .... Where there are various
means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen
is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.101
As the Baker rule had done, the new Whelan rule inquired whether other
ways to express the idea existed. 0 2
The court saw analogous support for its new rule in copyright doctrine
affecting scenes a faire and fact-intensive works. Scenes a faire are "in-
cidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable
. . . in the treatment of a given topic."' 10 3 Copyright does not protect them
because they are essential to the idea or topic involved.'0 Similarly, the
literary devices used in fact-intensive works seldom receive copyright pro-
tection, because the idea or purpose of a fact-intensive work, conveying
of accurate information, can only be accomplished in a limited number
of ways. 0 5
99. Id. at 104, 106.
100. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (insurance forms are copyrightable, but whether a
similar form infringes the copyright depends on the degree of possible variation
inherent in the subject matter).
101. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1236 (first emphasis in original; emphasis
of last sentence added).
102. In an important caveat, the court observed that the idea of some utilitarian
works such as computer programs might be the execution of "a certain function
in a certain way," and that such a program's structure might be essential to its
idea. Id. at 1238 n.34.
103. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460
F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
104. See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736
F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
105. 736 F.2d at 488.
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The Third Circuit believed that its new Whelan rule would further the
basic purpose of copyright law, "to create the most efficient and productive
balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information,
to promote learning, culture and development." ' 06 Although the court
admitted that "the economic implications of this rule are necessarily some-
what speculative,' 01 07 it asserted that the rule would preserve an appropriate
balance between competition and protection.' On the one hand, the rule
would protect a programmer's work in "developing the structure and logic
of the program,'1°9 which the court saw as a more economically significant
part of writing a program than the mere translatior of structure into
code." 0 At the same time, it would permit use of ideas found in earlier
programs, either by expressing the ideas through dissimilar program struc-
tures, or by using substantially similar structures where the structure of
the original program was necessary to its ideas."'
106. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1235.
107. Id. at 1237.
108. Id. The economic assumptions underlying the rule may be its weakest
point. A number of scholars have suggested that economic considerations, and the
way in which the computer industry has developed during the 1980s, suggest that
traditional copyright protection for software may produce negative social results.
See generally, e.g., Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
STANFORD L. REv. 1329 (1987).
109. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1237.
110. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
111. In adopting its new rule, Whelan rejected three arguments often advanced
for limiting copyright protection for computer programs to their literal source and
object code. One argument asserted that copying the structure of a computer
program requires so much time and effort that it constitutes independent creative
work, and that lesser copying efforts would be economically and practically valueless.
See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the
Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MnqN. L. REv. 1264, 1290 (1984). The court replied
that (1) copying of program structure in fact could give the copier a significant
economic advantage in savings of time and effort, and (2) "[t]he issue in a copyright
case is simply whether the copyright holder's expression has been copied, not how
difficult it was to do the copying." Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1237.
The next argument alleged that the concept of program structure was "too
vague to be useful in copyright cases." See Radcliffe, Recent Developments in
Copyright Law Related to Computer Software, 4 COMPUTER L. REP. 189, 194-97
(1985). The Third Circuit answered that even though limiting protection to source
and object code would "be simpler and would yield more definite answers," such
considerations did not outweigh the reasons supporting the extension of protection
to program structure. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1238.
The third argument contended that the development of knowledge in the
computer field requires a greater reliance on previous work than in other fields,
and hence a ban on copying should not apply to program structure, lest progress
be retarded. See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modi-
fication of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264, 1292 (1984).
The court was unconvinced, and observed that "copyright law has always recognized
... that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors." Whelan
Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1238.
[Vol. 54
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The court suggested limiting the Whelan rule's use to cases involving
computer programs or other utilitarian works. It declared that the rule
has its greatest force in the analysis of utilitarian or "functional" works
such as computer programs, for the purpose of such works is easily stated
and identified. By contrast, in cases involving works of literature or "non-
functional" visual representations, defining the purpose of the work may
be difficult. Since it may be impossible to discuss the purpose or function
of a novel, poem, sculpture or painting, the rule may have little or not
application to cases involving such works."2
VIII. APPLICATION OF T RULE TO THE FACTS OF WHELAN
The court announced that the clear purpose of the Dentalab program
was "to aid in the business operations of a dental laboratory." ' The
district court found that there were other programs on the market which
had the same purpose but dissimilar structure and organization. 1 4 The
Third Circuit said that this made it "equally clear that the structure of
the [Dentalab] program was not essential to [its] task .... The conclusion
is thus inescapable that the detailed structure of the Dentalab program is
part of the expression, not the idea, of that program."' n5
IX. NEW TEST FOR SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY n COMPUTER SOFTWARE
CASES
Having concluded that copyright protection extended to the structure
and organization of computer programs, the Third Circuit addressed the
issue of what constitutes sufficient evidence of substantial similarity capable
of supporting a finding that one computer program has infringed the
copyright of another.
The traditional test by which courts determine whether two copyrighted
works are substantially similar was set out in Arnstein v. Porter."16 The
Arnstein test requires a two-step process for finding an infringing degree
of substantial similarity between the works in question. In the first step,
the fact-finder determines whether the degree of similarity between the
works supports a conclusion that the alleged infringer copied from the
earlier work." 7 For this purpose, expert testimony is admissible." 8 In the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
115. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1238-39.
116. 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
117. Id. at 468.
118. Id.
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second step, the fact-finder determines whether the infringer copied un-
protected or protected elements of the original work; that is, whether the
copying was permissible or unlawful." 9 For this purpose, expert testimony
is not admissible: the fact finder decides from the perspective of a lay
observer. 2 0
Two scholars described the reason for the distinction between the two
steps as follows:
[E]xpert testimony is not competent to prove the legal conclusion of
infringement, which is entirely for the trier of fact .... The issue of
illicit as opposed to permissible copying is a matter for the lay observer
and not for expert witnesses nor for piece-by-piece analysis of the elements
of the two works. Permissible copying includes the taking of ideas; illicit
copying appropriates protected expression. The "lay observer" test or
"ordinary observer" test is the key to drawing this distinction. The ordinary
observer [standard] is similar to the reasonable person standard and is
meant to distinguish between those similarities in two works an observer
would notice and those the ordinary observer would tend to disregard as
immaterial and unrelated to the overall character of the two works.' 2'
The Third Circuit concluded, however, that the second step of the
Arnstein test, the ordinary observer step, was "of doubtful value in cases
involving computer programs ... ."'2 It gave two reasons for this con-
clusion. First, unlike novels or plays, computer programs are both complex
and unfamiliar to most lay observers.121 Second, when a computer software
infringement case is tried to a judge, as was the case in Whelan, the
distinction is likely to be meaningless in practice. 24 The court observed
that in such situations the judge
119. Id. at 468, 472-73. For example, if defendant's copying constituted "fair
use" as defined by the Copyright Act, defendant would not have infringed even
though he had copied. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
120. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1232.
121. A. MILUER & M. DAvis, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEmARKs
AND CoPYRIGHT § 22.2, at 333-34 (1983) (citations omitted).
122. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1232.
123. Id. One of the aspects of computer software which presents difficulties
for copyright law is the fact that two programs highly dissimilar in both structure
and written code can perform the same functions and even produce the same visible
output on-screen. See, e.g., Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855
(2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill.
1983). This means that programs cannot be compared solely on the basis of what
they do or what they look like to the user, but must be compared on the basis
of their structure and their code. One commentator notes that asking most judges
or juries to compare computer programs on this basis "is roughly analogous to
asking a judge or jury with no musical training to base a finding of infringement
of a symphony on a comparison of the scores of the two works, without listening
to the sounds represented by the notes." Gesmer, Developments in the Law of
Computer Software Copyright Infringement, 26 Jugnumucs J. 224, 227 (1986).
124. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1232-33.
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has been exposed to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is
supposed to ignore or "forget" that evidence in analyzing the problem
under the second step. Especially in complex cases, we doubt that the
"forgetting" can be effective when the expert testimony is essential to
even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question.'2
Accordingly, the court followed the lead of a number of federal district
courts, 26 and explicitly adopted a one-step substantial similarity test which
allows a finding of substantial similarity between computer programs based
on expert testimony.' 27 Since it took this view, the Third Circuit declined
to invalidate the lower court's finding of substantial similarity even though
that court had not followed the Arnstein test. 128
A. Types of Evidence Which Can Satisfy The Test
The Third Circuit held that the district court finding of substantial
similarity between the Dentalab and Dentcom programs was not clearly
erroneous. 129 The appellate opinion therefore did not provide a compre-
hensive list of the types of evidence which could support a finding of
substantial similarity between computer programs. 30 However, its holding
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp.
1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
752-53 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
127. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1233. The new Whelan test allows both
lay and expert testimony. However, the court's approval of both of the earlier
district court cases and of the lower court finding of substantial similarity in Whelan
based on expert testimony, make it clear that the one-step test allows a finding
of substantial similarity based on expert testimony alone. Id. The one-step Whelan
test finds support in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rules provide that "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R.
Evm. 702. The Rules also state that "testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EvID. 704.
128. Id. at 1232 (even though the district court did not "bifurcate its analysis,"
thus appearing to "have contravened the law of this circuit," it had applied the
appropriate standard).
129. Since this issue involved questions of fact, the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review applied. Id. at 1233 n.25.
130. One expert on computer software copyright issues has offered a taxonomy
of substantial similarity evidence which may aid in understanding Whelan and
succeeding cases. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PiTT. L.
REv. 1037, 1085-92 (1986). He would relabel the substantial similarity test as a
"surprising similarity test," suggesting that "to determine underlying similarity,
find evidence which reflects a surprising, improbable number of similar discretionary
choices between two programs which are supposed to share only functional sim-
ilarities." Id. at 1086. This evidence could be of three types: striking literal similarity,
1989]
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necessarily implied that the types of evidence which the district court
considered belong on such a list.
There were three types of evidence of substantial similarity between
the programs at issue in Whelan: that which showed similarity between
the programs' file structures, their screen outputs, and some of their
important subroutines. Since the court concluded that infringement had
occurred in Whelan, these types of evidence are likely to be important in
future cases.
1. File Structures
Computer program file structures are places within the program where
data input from the program user is stored. The court compared file
structures to manila folders in file drawers, or to "a very complex cata-
loguing structure like the structure of Lexis or Westlaw without any entries
yet made."' 3'
The Whelan defendants had argued that because file structures are
analogous to the blank accounting forms in Baker v. Selden,112 they are
surprising nonliteral similarity, and suspicious conduct.
Striking literal similarity, the equivalent of Nimmer's fragmented literal sim-
ilarity, see supra note 79, would exist where at least a small part of the allegedly
infringing program was copied literally. Since computer syntax and functional
similarity between programs can lead two programmers to write similar code, this
copied fragment would have to be "strikingly similar." Davidson, supra, at 1086.
An example would be where programmer "A" included his initials in a non-
functional comment line of his program, and programmer "B" copied the line
including the initials.
Surprising nonliteral similarity, the equivalent of Nimmer's comprehensive non-
literal similarity, see supra note 79, would be found
where the infringer made too many of the same discretionary programming
choices.... The choices of the infringer that should be compared with
those of the original program are the manner of expressing the transactions,
functions and algorithms accomplished by each subprogram (i.e., the man-
ner of expressing the ideas in the program).
Davidson, supra, at 1086. Davidson suggests eight points of comparison, including
(1) the non-functional, stylistic aspects of the program code, (2) the sequence of
program statements, (3) the degree to which subroutines optimally implement their
functions, (4) "kludges," or the degree to which subroutines eccentrically implement
their functions, (5) nonstandard algorithms or programming techniques (less likely
than standard algorithms to have come from the public domain), (6) the sequence
of subroutines, (7) the selection of subroutines (like paragraphing, the choice of
hov many subroutines to use is a matter of personal style), and (8) the data
structure of the programs. Davidson, supra, at 1086-88. Davidson's suggestions
regarding conduct evidence are discussed infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
131. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1242.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/9
19891 SOFTWARE COPYRIGHTS 143
not protected by copyright. 33 If this were true, evidence of file structure
similarity could never prove infringement. However, the Third Circuit
declared the majority rule on the issue to be that "blank forms may be
copyrighted if they are sufficiently innovative that their arrangement of
information is itself informative."'' 34 It found that the Dentalab file struc-
tures were in fact "sufficiently informative to deserve copyright protec-
tion."' 35
The opinion acknowledged that "for certain tasks there are only a
very limited number of file structures available, and in such cases the
structures might not be copyrightable and similarity of file structures might
not be strongly probative of similarity of the program as a whole.' ' 36
However, the evidence in Whelan showed that the idea of the Dentalab
program, the business management of a dental laboratory, could be ex-
pressed by other programs using "significantly different file structures.' 37
The Whelan approach to file structure evidence can be summarized as
follows: if the file structures are informative enough in themselves to qualify
for copyright protection, and if they are not an essential means of achieving
a particular function (which would make them necessary incidents of the
idea involved), evidence that the file structures of two programs are similar
can be used to show substantial similarity between the programs and thus
help to prove infringement. One implication for future cases is that file
structure similarity evidence is most likely to be admitted to show substantial
similarity between programs where a plaintiff can show that dissimilar file
structures can achieve the same result.
2. Screen Outputs
Screen outputs are the images a computer program places on the
computer screen to communicate with the program user. Obviously, the
program causes the images, and an infringing program might produce
screen images like those of the program it copied as a result of the copying.
The problem with using similarity of screen outputs to prove substantial
similarity between programs is that two programs highly dissimilar in both
structure and written code can produce the same visible screen output. 3
8
Screen output evidence thus presents a basic admissibility question: does
the probative value of such evidence outweigh the risk that it will unfairly
133. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1242.
134. Id. at 1243.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1243 n.43.
137. Id. at 1243.
138. See, e.g., Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d
Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
The Whelan opinion acknowledged this fact. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1244
n.45.
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prejudice the trier of fact in that it is more vivid and understandable than
other, more technical evidence?139 The Whelan court recognized this risk,
but noted that "[sicreen outputs are not so enticing that a trier of fact
could not evaluate them rationally and with a cool head."' 140 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals seemed impressed by the potential prejudice
involved. It appears to have approved the lower court's admission of screen
output similarity evidence primarily on the basis of the substantial deference
normally accorded trial court decisions on admissibility.' 4 It seems likely
that courts will limit the role of such evidence in future cases to confirming
other evidence of substantial similarity.
3. Subroutines
The court defined "subroutine" as a discrete module or part of a
program with a readily identifiable task. 42 The evidence at trial had shown
similarity between five important subroutines in the two programs at issue. 43
Defendants argued on appeal that "one cannot prove substantial sim-
ilarity of two works without comparing the entirety, or at least the greater
part, of the works.' 1" They asserted that similarity between these sub-
routines was not sufficient to show similarity between the programs as a
whole, and that structural similarity could not be established by comparing
"only a small fraction of the two works."' 45
The court rejected this argument as contrary to traditional copyright
doctrine. It declared that
There is no general requirement that most of each of two works be
compared before a court can conclude that they are substantially similar.
In the cases of literary works-novels, movies, or plays, for example-it
is often impossible to speak of "most" of the work. The substantial
similarity inquiry cannot be simply quantified in such instances. Instead,
the court must make a qualitative, not quantitative, judgment about the
character of the work as a whole and the importance of the substantially
similar portions of the work. Computer programs are no different. Because
all steps of a computer program are not of equal importance, the relevant
inquiry cannot therefore be the purely mechanical one of whether most
139. Id. at 1244.
140. Id. at 1245.
141. Id. One member of the Third Circuit panel concluded that it was error
to admit such evidence, but that reversal was not required because the error was
harmless, given the convincing nature of the other evidence. Id. at 1244 n.45.
142. Id. at 1230 n.15.
143. Id. at 1228. The five subroutines handled "order entry, invoicing, ac-
counts receivable, end of day procedure and end of month procedure." Id. The
trial court had accepted the conclusion of plaintiff's expert that the five subroutines
"performed almost identically." Id.
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of the programs' steps are similar. Rather, because we are concerned with
the overall similarities between the programs, we must ask whether the
most significant steps of the programs are similar.146
Whelan thus appears to stand for the proposition that evidence of
similarity between qualitatively significant subroutines in two programs may
be enough to establish substantial structural similarity between the programs
as a whole. This would prove infringement even where the similar parts
represent a quantitatively small portion of the programs in question. The
body of case authority which the Whelan court cited suggests that this is
in fact well settled, and that the Whelan decision did not bend traditional
doctrine as some writers have asserted. 47
X. POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF DEFENDANT CONDUCT ON TiE SUBSTANTIAL
SMULAIUTY IssUE
A number of commentators have suggested that the Whelan defendants'
conduct may have been a powerful but unmentioned factor in the Third
Circuit's decision. 148 As one observed, "Inferences from conduct alone may
not provide sufficient evidence of underlying similarity, and may be re-
buttable .... When coupled with other evidence, however, like too many
similar discretionary programming choices, it can make a case of underlying
similarity overwhelming.' '1 49 A review of the facts in Whelan makes it clear
that defendant's conduct was improper and unfair in several respects. 50
Rand Jaslow's improper access to the Dentalab source code,' 5 uncontested
146. Id. at 1245-46 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
147. See, e.g., Goldberg, Computers and Copyright: The Next Generation,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 1, at 28, col. 2 ("Departing from the general
rule that a relatively substantial quantity of a utilitarian work must be copied
before infringement is found, the Third Circuit held that substantial similarity, and
hence infringement of a computer program, can be based on the taking of a
quantitatively small, but qualitatively important portion of a protected program")
(emphasis in original).
148. See, e.g., Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory For the Litigation of
Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REv. 563 (1985); Davidson, Com-
mon Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Prr. L. REv. 1037 (1986); Gesmer, De-
velopments in the Law of Computer Software Copyright Infringement, 26 JutmnuTIcs
J. 224 (1986); Raysman & Brown, Copyright Protection Extended to a "Total
Concept" of Software, 9 Nat'l L.J., Jan. 26, 1987, at 16, col. 2.; Staines, Idle
or idle fixe?, 50 MOD. L. REv. 368 (1987).
149. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PT. L. REv.
1037, 1088-89 (1986).
150. See supra notes 9-33 and accompanying text. Indeed, it appears that an
attorney hoping to persuade a court to extend copyright protection to computer
program structure could hardly have wished for a more favorable set of facts.
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on appeal, 5 2 could have been particularly influential, since some courts
may tend to require less evidence of substantial similarity when strong
evidence of defendant access to plaintiff's work is present."' Other recent
copyright infringement cases involving computer software have also involved
defendant misconduct,"4 and two scholars have suggested that the conduct
of alleged infringers should be the principal focus in such cases. 5 Evidence
concerning the fairness or unfairness of the parties' conduct may prove
important in future cases as well.
XI. APPLICATION oF Ti WHELAN DECISION IN LATER CASES
The Third Circuit's decision in Whelan has already influenced the
outcome of three later reported decisions in computer software copyright
cases.' 5 6 In these cases, the Fifth Circuit and two federal district courts
considered the implications and explored the boundaries of the Whelan
decision.
A. Skepticism from a Sister Circuit
In Plains Cotton Cooperative v. Goodpasture Computer Service, 1 , the
Fifth Circuit upheld denial of a preliminary injunction against alleged
152. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1229.
153. See supra note 48.
154. See SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985) (defendant obtained a license for plaintiff's source code for the purpose
of creating a competing program for a different computer); Williams v. Arndt,
626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985) (defendant obtained one of limited number of
copies of plaintiff's book on commodities trading, promising to write a program
based on the book for sole use of purchaser of the copy borrowed, but instead
programmed for public sale as unauthorized computer version of plaintiff's book).
155. Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer
Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REv. 563 (1985).
156. See infra notes 157-216 and accompanying text. Three other cases have
also cited Whelan on fairly minor points not involving the scope of copyright
protection for computer software. See Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enterprises,
815 F.2d 323, 329 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 820 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988) (Whelan cited as supporting authority for literal
interpretation of statutory definition of "work for hire"); Lasercomb America,
Inc., v. Holiday Steel Rule Die Corp., 656 F. Supp. 612, 615-16 (M.D.N.C.),
appeal dismissed, 829 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting defendant's contention that
its copying was permissible as the creation of its own product via a laborious,
expensive process, based on the Whelan statement that because copying required
great effort by the copier does not mean the copying does not infringe) (summary
judgment on the issue of software copyright infringement was appropriate where
defendant's brief admitted a conclusion by defendant's experts that the two programs
could not have been independently written); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (Whelan cited as
authority that proper limits of judicial discretion on awarding recovery of costs
and attorneys' fees remain unclear, with little guidance from case law).
157. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 54
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infringement of copyright in a computer program designed to assist farmers
in marketing cotton.158 The program, called Telcot, was usable on terminals
connected to the Cooperative's mainframe computer, but not on personal
computers. 59
The four Cooperative employees who had written Telcot later left the
Cooperative for Commodity Exchange Service Company (CSX), taking with
them a copy of the Telcot source code. 6° While employed by CSX, 6' they
designed a personal-computer version of Telcot 62 CSX then went bankrupt,
and Goodpasture Computer Service hired the four men. Goodpasture knew
about their work on a Telcot clone, 63 and had the four sign agreements
not to breach any "confidences of their former employers" during work
at Goodpasture. 164 After working for Goodpasture for only 20 days, the
four men completed "a personal computer version of a cotton exchange
program" called GEMS, which Goodpasture began selling in incomplete
form less than a year later.165 The Cooperative sued both Goodpasture and
the four employees, alleging that GEMS infringed Telcot's copyright. 66
The Cooperative sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting sale of
GEMS. 67 It presented evidence that GEMS was "very similar to Telcot
on the functional specification, programming, and documentation levels."' 16
Plaintiff's expert testified that "the similarities in the two [programs] were
sufficient as a basis for his opinion that defendants had copied plaintiff's
[program]."' 169 However, the four employees alleged that they had not
copied Telcot, but that in writing GEMS they "drew on their knowledge
158. Id. at 1257-58. Plaintiff's program, called Telcot, was "designed to
provide [the Cooperative's] members with information regarding cotton prices and
availability, with accounting services, and with the capability to consummate actual
sales electronically." Id. at 1258.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. On leaving the Cooperative, the four were employed by Commodity
Exchange Service Company, which had contracted with the Cooperative for de-
velopment of a personal computer version of Telcot. Id. That contract was terminated
shortly after the four men changed employers. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. One of the employees violated this agreement by bringing with him
a computer disk containing Telcot programming designs, and was later fired for
having done so. Id. at 1259.
165. Id.
166. The Cooperative also alleged that Goodpasture had misappropriated its
trade secrets, gaining access to them through these employees. The district court
ruled that plaintiffs had not established substantial likelihood of success on the
merits on this point. Id. at 1259, 1262-64.
167. Id. at 1257, 1259.
168. Id. at 1259. Several pages of the GEMS design manual were directly
copied from the Telcot design manual. Id.
169. Id. at 1260 n.1.
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of the cotton industry and expertise in computer programming and design
gained over a number of years.' 70 Defendants' expert testified that Telcot
was "too large to have been copied and modified in the amount of time
[the employees] took to create GEMS," and that the employees could have
"take[n] their knowledge of the cotton industry and ... recreate[d] a
similar vehicle.' 7' In his opinion, the many differences between the two
programs indicated that defendants had not copied Telcot.7 2
The district court ruled that plaintiff had not established substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, 7 1 in that the evidence did not dem-
onstrate enough similarity between the two programs to make an infringe-
ment finding at trial probable.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred as a matter of
law in not considering evidence of substantial similarity between the structure
of the two programs. 74 Plaintiff cited Whelan as authority for the view
that copyright protection extends to program structure, and urged the court
to adopt the Third Circuit's reasoning on that issue. 75
The Fifth Circuit declined to follow Whelan, at least at the preliminary
stage of litigation presented in Plains Cotton.7 6 One of its two reasons
for doing so was that the record available on pretrial review of the injunction
denial was necessarily less than complete. 77 The other was that, in the
circumstances of the case, the structure of plaintiff's program could rep-
resent idea rather than expression and thus fail to qualify for protection.,"
At first glance, the Plains Cotton opinion appears to indicate a Fifth
Circuit rejection of the Whelan premise that copyright can protect the
structure of a program. 79 However, a closer look reveals that such a
conclusion would be overhasty.
170. Id. at 1259.
171. Id. at 1260.
172. Id. at 1260 n.1.
173. Id. at 1259. The district court also based denial of the injunction on
failure to establish substantial likelihood of irreparable injury, since the court
believed any injury to plaintiffs would be compensable in damages under the
circumstances of the case. Id. at 1261.
174. Id. at 1260, 1261-62.




179. The Fifth Circuit announced that it looked to Synercom Technology,
Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978), decided
by one of its own district courts, for guidance on the issue of protection for
program structure. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262. It apparently viewed Synercom
as suggesting that the copyrightability of sequence and form should be treated
differently in a computer context than in any other, a position rejected by Whelan.
Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262 (citing Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1240). This
view of Synercom is open to criticism. The Synercom court held only that input
formats like those at issue before it were unprotected, not that all forms of computer
program structure were unprotected. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1014.
[Vol. 54
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The record on appeal in Plains Cotton included evidence that "many
of the similarities between the GEMS and Telcot programs [were] dictated
by the externalities of the cotton market."' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
"decline[d] to hold that those [market] patterns cannot constitute 'ideas'
in a computer context."' 8 These statements imply that the court believed
the idea of presenting cotton marketing information in a computer program
might only be expressible through substantially similar program structures.
If that proved true, the structure needed would be a "necessary incident"
of the idea, and would not be protected by copyright. 8 2
Such a conclusion is entirely consonant with the Whelan rule for
distinguishing idea from expression in computer software cases.' 83 The Third
Circuit's finding that copyright protected the program structure in Whelan
depended on a conclusion that it was not a necessary part of the idea of
that program. 84 Since Plains Cotton appeared potentially distinguishable
from Whelan on this point, the Fifth Circuit could have reached the result
it wanted in Plains Cotton by applying Whelan rather than declining to
adopt it.
It thus appears that, contrary to first appearances, Plains Cotton need
not be viewed as creating a conflict among the circuits on whether copyright
protects the structure of software. Rather, Plains Cotton reemphasizes the
highly fact-dependent, case-specific nature of such protection. The Fifth
Circuit's position appears reconcilable with that of the Third Circuit in
Whelan: when the structure of a computer program represents expression
rather than idea, it is protected by copyright. While this may leave the
software world to the unpredictable application of the Whelan rule dis-
tinguishing idea and expression, such uncertainty may be the price for
shelter under a copyright umbrella. The idea/expression dichotomy has
always defied easy or predictable application in individual cases.'85
180. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
185. No less a copyright authority than Judge Learned Hand observed:
It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at
common law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally
to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That
has never been the law, but, as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be
the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large, so that ... the decisions
cannot help much in a new case ....
[When the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but an abstract
of the whole, decision is more troublesome. Upon any work ... a great
number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident [the literal verbal expression] is left out. The
last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what
the [work] is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there
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B. Conflict Over Scope of Protection and Screen Displays
The Whelan opinion treated similarity between screen displays as cor-
roborative evidence of substantial structural similarity between computer
programs, and paid considerable respect to the admissibility problems which
such evidence raise.' Two subsequent cases in the federal district courts
have treated the issue of whether copyright protection extends not only to
computer program structure but also to the screen displays the programs
generate. They reached contrary conclusions.
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.8 7 was an copyright
infringement action by the owners of Print Shop, a popular home printing
program enabling personal computer users to "create customized greeting
cards, signs, banners, and posters," against the owners of Printmaster, a
program performing similar functions.' Plaintiff alleged that "the overall
appearance, structure, and sequence of the audiovisual displays" generated
by Printmaster infringed the Print Shop's copyright. 89
Unison World's primary business was converting existing computer
programs into versions for different computers. Broderbund asked Unison
World to develop an IBM-compatible version of Print Shop, which was
then available only in an Apple computer version. 90 Because Broderbund
wanted an exact reproduction, Unison World programmers attempted to
duplicate the Print Shop program as exactly as possible.' 9' When negotiations
between plaintiff and defendant over ownership of the rights to the IBM
version broke down, Unison World programmers turned their efforts to
developing an "enhanced" version of Print Shop which improved on the
original. 92 In this process, defendant's programmers kept the parts of Print
Shop they had already incorporated into their work, including the a con-
siderable number of screen display designs, including the menu screens,
which present program commands for user selection, and various screens
within the greeting card, sign, and picture editor portions of the program. 93
After the programers added some original features, defendants marketed
is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand,
J.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
186. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
187. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
188. Id. at 1129-30.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1130.
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their work under the name of Printmaster. 194 Plaintiff's suit followed.
Defendant argued that "the idea underlying the menu screens, input
formats, and sequencing of screens in 'Print Shop' [was] indistinguishable
from its expression."' 95 It asserted that there was "no other conceivable
way to structure" a program fulfilling the same functions.196 Plaintiff
introduced another competing program, Stickybear Printer, which performed
similar functions but had very different menu screens and screen se-
quences. 19 That evidence convinced the court that the idea and expression
of Print Shop were distinguishable from one another. 98
While defendant cited earlier authority' 99 to establish that only the
source and object codes of computer programs are protected by copyright,
plaintiff cited Whelan as extending protection beyond these literal program
elements.' The district court read Whelan as "stand[ing] for the proposition
that copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer
program, but rather that it extends to the overall structure of a program,
including its audiovisual displays."2' It applied the Whelan rule for dis-
tinguishing idea from expression in the software context, and concluded
that "the separable idea of 'Print Shop' is the creation of greeting cards,
banners, posters and signs that contain infinitely variable combinations of
text, graphics, and borders."'2 2 It ruled that the existence of Stickybear
Printer demonstrated that this idea could be expressed through different
screen display structures, and that therefore Print Shop's screen displays
were protected by copyright in the program itself. 23
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1132.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1132-33.
199. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computer Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
200. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132.
201. Id. at 1133 (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. Id. The court also ruled that the design of Print Shop's screen displays
was based on artistic rather than utilitarian considerations, a fact which preserved
the expressive character of the design; that copyright protection for the menu screens
was not barred by the "rules and instructions doctrine"; that the copyright notice
included in Print Shop's visual display sequence was statutorily adequate. Id. at
1133-35.
The court found both direct and circumstantial evidence indicating that de-
fendant had copied plaintiff's work. Id. at 1135. Although the direct evidence was
sufficient to establish copying, the opinion also discussed the circumstantial evidence
in the interest of completeness. Id. at 1136-37. Interestingly, since it had cited
Whelan for its earlier conclusion on the scope of protection, the court made no
mention of Whelan's one-part, expert-opinion-based test for substantial similarity,
but found such similarity on the basis of the traditional Arnstein two-part test
involving an "ordinary reasonable person" perspective. Id. at 1136-37. The Arnstein
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Digital Communications Associates v. Softklone Distributing
Corporation2 4 was a suit by the owners of the copyright for Crosstalk
XVI, a popular communications programs for personal computers, against
Mirror, a similar program which defendants sold as a Crosstalk XVI clone.
The part of Mirror over which Crosstalk XVI's owners sued was its status
or main command menu screen. 20s Mirror's owners claimed that such screens
were not protected by copyright. Plaintiff claimed that defendant had copied
its Crosstalk XVI status screen, and that the plaintiff's copyright protected
the screen.20
The federal district court cited Whelan as the leading case on the scope
of copyright protection for computer programs .20 While the court read
Whelan as extending copyright protection to program structure, it observed
that "[w]hile finding that copying of a program's screen displays may serve
as indirect evidence of copying of a program, the Whelan court did not
specifically extend a computer program's copyright protection to its screen
displays." 20 The Digital court also noted that Broderbund had "gone a
step further than Whelan and ha[d] concluded that a computer program's
copyright protection extends to its audiovisual screen displays. ' '2°9
The Digital opinion concluded that Broderbund's reading of Whelan
was "overexpansive and erroneous," because Whelan "dealt only with the
evidentiary use of the copying of screen displays for the purpose of es-
tablishing copying of the underlying computer program. ' 210 In the Digital
court's view, Whelan "did not stand for the proposition that screen displays
test is discussed supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text; the Whelan test is
discussed supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text. The Broderbund court ap-
parently believed that the screen display evidence was understandable by lay fact
finders, and thus the expert-based test was not needed. As the court put it, "the
ordinary observer could hardly avoid being struck by the eerie resemblance between
the screens of the two programs." Id. at 1137.
204. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
205. Id. at 452-53.
206. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines "audiovisual works" as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically
intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or
tapes, in which the works are embodied.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Copyright subsists in such works
under the provisions of the Act. Id. § 102(a)(6). Several appellate decisions have
approved copyright protection of computer program screen displays as audiovisual
works. See, e.g., Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d
Cir. 1983); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
207. Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 455.
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)).
210. Id.
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are protected by the computer program's copyright from copying. ' 2 11
The Digital court expressly rejected the conclusion reached in Brod-
erbund, and held that copyright protection for a computer program does
not extend to the screen displays generated by the program. 2 2 As the court
put it,
[S]creen displays generated by computer programs are not direct "copies"
or "reproductions" of the literary or substantive content of the computer
programs. This distinction results from the fact that the same screen can
be created by a variety of separate and independent computer programs.
It is somewhat illogical to conclude that a screen can be a "copy" of
many different programs. Therefore, it is this court's opinion that a
computer program's copyright does not extend to the program's screen
displays and that copying of a program's screen displays, without evidence
of copying of the program's source code, object code, sequence, organ-
ization or structure, does not state a claim of infringement.213
Accordingly, the court ruled that the Mirror status screen did not infringe
plaintiff's copyright in the Crosstalk XVI program.
21 4
This holding includes program "sequence, organization or structure"
wvith program source and object code in the list of program elements




212. Id. at 455.
213. Id. at 455-56. By contrast, one court has held that copyright of a
program-generated screen display as an audiovisual work also protects the program
to the extent that the program embodies the display. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v.
Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986).
214. Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 456.
215. Id.
216. The plaintiff in Digital also claimed that the Mirror status screen violated
plaintiff's separate copyright in the Crosstalk XVI status screen itself as an au-
diovisual work. Id. at 454. The Whelan opinion influenced the Digital court's
determination of this issue as well. The court applied the Whelan rule for distin-
guishing idea from expression, and found that the screen contained both ideas and
expression not necessary to those ideas. Id. at 458-59. The court asserted that ideas
such as "the use of a screen to, reflect the status of the program ... the use of
a command driven program ... and the typing of two symbols to activate a
specific command" were not protectable by copyright. Id. at 459. However, it
stated that expressive elements such as "the arrangement of the parameter/command
terms" and "the highlighting and capitalizing of two specific letters of the parameter/
command terms listed" were protectable. These expressive aspects of the screen
involved "considerable stylistic creativity and authorship above and beyond the
ideas embodied in the status screen," and represented only one of many ways of
expressing the ideas involved. Id. at 460.
The court also used Whelan to support its finding that the status screen was
not barred from copyright protection as a blank form because the screen itself
conveyed information. Id. at 461. It cited Whelan as correctly stating the rule that
blank forms or computer program file structures are within the scope of copyright
19891
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It seems clear that, as between Broderbund and Digital, the latter
interprets Whelan correctly as to copyright protection for screen displays.
The Whelan court did not say that screen displays themselves fell within
the scope of protection afforded by program copyright. It merely allowed
evidence of screen display similarity to support other evidence suggesting
substantial program similarity, and expressed some reservations about going
even that far.217 Future decisions probably will interpret screen displays as
outside the scope of copyright in the programs which generate them, leaving
the displays to the potential protection of separate copyright as audiovisual
works.
The fact that the Broderbund court tried to stretch Whelan so far may
be a further indication that evidence of misconduct or blatantly unfair
behavior by a party can strongly influence the outcome of software copyright
infringement cases.
CONCLUSION
In future copyright infringement cases involving computer software,
attorneys for both sides are likely to find that coming to grips with Whelan
is essential to successful advocacy. Both the careful reasoning of the Third
Circuit's opinion and the reaction of other courts in later cases suggest
that the principles enunciated in Whelan will become permanent additions
to the law in this area. While true predictability in matters of software
copyright remains out of reach, the Whelan decision has further defined
the scope of copyright protection for computer programs, and has provided
an analytical framework for future decisions.
WM. DAVID TAYLOR III
protection if their arrangement and organization itself conveys information. Id.
Presumably because it was comparing screen displays and felt no need for
expert assistance, the Digital court did not employ the Whelan one-part, expert-
based substantial similarity test, but used the traditional Arnstein test. Id. at 464-
65.
217. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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